

27 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT : Revised CIP Review Group Procedures
for 1967.

1. This year's operating procedures for the 1967 review of the CIP spell out more clearly than ever before the rights and the responsibilities of the Review Group members; the effect is that each of them will now have to "stand up and be counted" on every item in the CIP. When the Secretary of Defense receives the recommended program from the Review Group this year, it will carry either the formal concurrence for the DCI or a specific written dissent from the majority position of the Group with respect to the program as a whole or any specific item or items included in it.

2. In summary, the rights and responsibilities of the Review Group members are:

a. In preparation for the Review Group deliberations each member is expected to review and analyze the PCR's (Program Change Recommendations) submitted by the DOD components and also the DIA recommended CIP, then formulate a position on the program recommended for each unit or activity included in the CIP (of which there are over 150).

b. Requests for further information and notification of any areas of disagreement a member may have with the PCR's should be submitted to DIA by 15 May since the formal deliberations of the Group are to start on 5 June 67.

c. After DIA has briefed the Review Group on an intelligence function, each of the members will present his position thereon.

d. The members will obtain the concurrence of their respective offices on the proposed PCD's (Program Change Decisions) prepared for the Group's consideration by DIA's Office of Plans and Programs.

e. In view of the tight time schedule for the review, it will be necessary for each of the members to determine expeditiously the position of his office regarding each CIP unit and activity. This job should not be too difficult if the necessary homework is done prior to the formal meetings of the Group. Revision of these preliminary positions would probably not be necessary except in those cases where it develops that the majority opinion of the Group is significantly different than the position developed, for example, by the DCI's representative. In such cases the DCI's position would be reviewed in the light of the additional evidence presented at the Group's meeting and we would either continue to hold the original position and be prepared to put in a written dissent or go along with the majority.

f. Any member may request the Chairman to convene the Group for a specified purpose.

g. Any member may request an Executive Session of the Group from which all briefers, observers and back-up personnel will be excluded except for individuals specifically requested to attend.

h. Review Group action, positions and recommendations will be determined by majority vote and each office represented on the Group will have one vote which may be cast by a member or by his designated alternate.

i. Any statements of dissent from a position which has been supported by a majority of the Review Group and thereby reflects the Group's recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, will be in writing and signed by the head of the submitting office, Bureau or Agency, or a designated deputy. In the case of the DCI that would be the D/DCI/NIPE.

3. In light of the above it is clear that the DCI's position with respect to the CIP, in whole or in part, will be a matter of record. Accordingly, we should do our best to make sure that any position the DCI takes with respect to an intelligence effort in the CIP is not inconsistent with the positions he may be taking on a related effort in the CIA, i. e., same target, same functional area, etc. To minimize wherever possible and at least be able

to have early warning of any potential problem areas of this type, we propose to carry on our review of the CIP in this fashion:

a. As early as possible, at least by the time the first CIP material becomes available for study, we will get a preliminary briefing on the upcoming CIA budget with specific attention to any significant changes in the allocation of resources. This preliminary picture will of course be based on the original Office submissions, the counter-parts of the Service submissions in the CIP.

b. As each CIP unit or activity is studied to arrive at our preliminary position on it, the following factors will be considered:

(1) To what extent does the activity or unit under consideration engage in intelligence activities functionally similar to those carried on by the CIA and how closely do they match in terms of the areas they are operating in and the targets against which they are deployed?

(2) Where a CIP unit or activity does match one in CIA, how do they compare in terms of both the size and the trend of resources proposed for them?

(3) An effort will also be made to obtain some preliminary picture of the programming trend in the CCP and the NRO so that any significant inconsistencies between those programs and the CIP can be detected early in the game and appropriate action taken.

c. We have a special problem with respect to that part of the CIP that involves clandestine collection. [redacted] has informed us that some of the people in DIA that he deals with in coordinating under [redacted]

[redacted] Of course, nothing could be farther from the truth and this point has been made several times during previous CIP reviews. However, we have new people in some parts of DIA, so a further effort must be made to negate the development of any such precedent. We propose to do the following:

(1) Those CIP units and activities that are engaged in

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
(2) In any case, we will make it clear within the CIP Review Group that our approval of the proposed program for a CIP unit or activity engaged in clandestine collection does in no way constitute coordination of that activity under the provisions of []. However, any specific problems detected in this area would best be handled directly between you and General Carroll and not raised at all with the CIP Review Group. In other words, it is strictly a "family matter" and not a subject for debate by any outsiders.

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4. This year we should take advantage of the more formalized CIP review procedures and use individual "position papers" not just to indicate dissents (there are not likely to be many, if any, of them) but rather to educate all concerned, including the Secretary of Defense, with respect to the Community-wide perspective from which the DCI is required to observe any part of the Intelligence Community. No other person represented on the Group has the obligation to conduct his review with such a comprehensive approach. It is also to be hoped that these position papers taken together will illustrate the point that the DCI looks upon the CIP units and activities with varying degrees of concern depending upon their relationship to the overall Community in general and in particular, their relationship to all other Community efforts of a similar or related nature. It is conceivable that we may find units or activities that should not, in terms of the DCI's responsibility, be included in the Community at all and this viewpoint could be brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

5. We continue to have a basic problem in the CIP and that is its lack of completeness. The CIP does not and is not intended

to show the totality of DOD's intelligence effort less those covered in the CCP. The exclusions are not even consistent. The policy is that intelligence activities of the numbered armies and air forces and the intelligence staffs of the uniservice and unified commands will not be included, yet the CIP shows any and all IDHS resource activities including those supporting the excluded activities. We understand that the BOP is going to make a move to have more of these things included in the CIP and we will have to consider our position with respect to such proposals when its specific details become available. The DCI must in principle agree with any such proposal because there are no exclusions in his responsibility to coordinate the foreign intelligence effort of the U. S.



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